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ADDRESS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR MIKE MANSFIELD
to a joint meeting
of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, Kansai Committee for Economic Development,
Kansai Economic Federation, u.s.-Japan Society and the
American Chamber of Commerce in Japan
ROYAL HOTEL, OSAKA
APRIL 5, 1978

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE:

U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

I would like, today, to talk about the u.s.-Japan economic
and trading relationship.

These obviously will be the views,

impressions and hopes of a layman.

I am not sure that there are

any real experts in international economics nowadays, but I have
never felt more like a layman than I do today, in addressing this
distinguished group on these topics.

Anyone who has any knowledge of Japan knows that Osaka is
one of the world's major business centers.

It has often been

called the "Chicago" of Japan, but it is more like Chicago, Pittsburgh, San Francisco and Dallas all rolled into one.

There are

many famous companies which are home-based in Osaka but I was

78-GR

intereste~learn

- 2 that Sumitomo started with some small copper

many years ago.

mines in9

I also got my start in the copper

mines (almost as long ago as Sumitomo) but they were in Butte,
Montana rather than in Shikoku.

Most of you arc economists

I am not.

an area of expertise, it's politics.

However, if I have

And most of what I have to

say here today is based upon my 34 years of service in the U.S.
Congress.

In my view, occasional problems are to be expected in

the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic relationship because we are
both democratic societies in which the representatives of the
people have important responsibilities which often conflict.

Whether they be members of the Congress or members of the
Diet, our politicians must represent the interests of the people
who elect them and, at the same time, they must try to act in the
interests of the country as a whole.
Congress to be

sensi~ive

It is proper for the U.S.

to the specific needs of American busi-

ness, labor, farme:cs and consumers just as the Japanese Diet
should respond to the same needs in Japanese society.
believe that this is

~he

Some may

bane of our relationship because the

responses to specific domestic needs are not always consistent
with the larger realities of our international trading relationships.

But, I believe that the fact that both countries have

working democrac1es which are responsive to the needs of the
people is our greatest st:cength.

-
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As nations, we are fairly new to the business of responding
to the challenges of the international marketplace.

Inadequate

understanding of the realities of that marketplace may be at the
root of many of our problems,but any successful politician is
an expert at identifying that which is of immediate concern to
his constituents.

In the

u.s.

Congress, as in the Japanese Diet,

the name of the game is political survival.

No politician can

ignore the plight of constituents who have been thrown out of
work because of competition from abroad.
not long remain in office.

If he does, he will

In both our countries the leadership

expresses great concern about macro-economic issues, about exchange rates, current account surpluses and the like.

That is as

it should be because these global problems affect virtually every
human being on the face of this earth.

Our leaders have perceived,

and I believe correctly, that these problems must
be solved other..-----wise all of our efforts to solve smaller bilateral problems will
be meaningless.

But it is human nature to be most concerned with those
problems which affect one's daily life most directly.

Political

reality forces us to consider sectors of our economies such as
beef, steel, automobiles, citrus fruits, and

t~e

like.

It is
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within specific sectors that politicians of all countries,
especially in Japan and the U.S., are subject to pressure
from their constituents, from industries and from special
interest groups.

Therefore we can't sit in an ivory tower

considering only those issues and problems with global impact
we must also work extremely hard at resolving a huge and ever
growing number of small issues which directly affect the daily
lives of our people.

That is the source of most of the polit-

ical heat.

That is why seemingly small problems like quotas on specific
products like oranges, while of little significance in terms of
the overall volume of U.S.-Japan trade, can have tremendous impact on the state of that trading relationship.

They are more

emotional rather than economic issues and they can create huge
perceptual problems.

Imports of citrus fruit into Japan are widely seen here as a
threat to a major industry.but the Japanese Government's recent
action to increase the quota on oranges will allow the import of
only 45,000 tons this year.

This amounts to less than half a kilo-

gram per Japanese for a full year, and will have little impact upon
the Japanese nikan industry's production of 3 to 4
year.

mi~lion

tons per

But while these amounts are economically insignificant, they
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can have an important and positive political impact as concrete
proof that Japan is willing to take tangible steps to come to
terms with the specific bilateral economic problems which confront us.

I spent most of my life in the
the people of the State of Montana.

u.s.

Congress representing

A great many of those people

raise cattle or grain or are involved in agriculture in some way .
As a member of the House and later of the Senate, I voted for
agricultural subsidies and quotas.

I grew up close to and on the

land. Like many Japanese, I believe that it's important for any
country to maintain agriculture as part of its economy.

I know

that agriculture is a sensitive area and always liable to misunderstandings.

The most difficult problem in the Tokyo Round has

been agriculture.

But the

u.s.

is pushing very hard in Geneva for

a liberalization of the global agricultural market.

We have asked

that the cut in agricultural tariffs be subject to the same general
formula as all other imports and if the Tokyo Round reaches a successful conclusion agriculture must be part of the package.

This should not have any cataclysmic effect upon the structure
of the world economy because the implementation will take place
over a long period of time.

The dislocations in Japan will not be

great, but as I said, I understand how difficult any measure can be
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which affects farmers.

The perceptions are all too often more

important than the realities.
excellent example.

Japan's quota on beef is another

The small changes in this quota as a result

of the Strauss-Ushiba talks will hardly affect Japan's domestic
beef producers at all.

But I realize,and I hope that my former

colleagues in the U.S. Congress realize,that these changes
and those affecting citrus were made at great political cost
here in Japan.

In spite of the

h~gh

political cost here, I do fear that

the changes made may not be large enough to affect long-stand ing
perceptions in the
products.

u.s.

of Japan as a closed market for these

But Americans could understand a government program

of aid to Japan's half million farm families, which raise an
average of four cattle per farm, which would allow them to produce beef at prices competitive with imported beef.

Such a

program could help the farmer, lower prices for Japanese consumers, and provide increased opportunities for imports as well.

That may not be the best solution for Japan.

I am simply

mentioning it as a device which has worked for some products in
practical political terms in the U.S.

I admit it is not a solu-

tion which will seem ideal to the Livestock Industry Promotion
Corporation, or the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

But

politics is the art of compromise and in the highly interdependent world of today, trade-offs are the rule rather than the
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exception.

For example, if Japan opens its beef import market

completely, we will sell more beef but less feed grains.

This

i s an issue that eventually will have to be faced head-on.
At some point in the future, the interests of Japan's trading
partners and Japanese consumers will come together and a new
system of greater benefits for all will result.

You may think that this is special pleading because agri cul t ure is an area where the U.S. has a great comparative
advantage over most other countries and

because our agricul-

t ural exports are vital to our balance of payments.
true, and Japan is our most important customer .

That is

As you might

know, there is more land under cultivation for Japan in the
t han there is for Japan in Japan.

u. s .

And, while we certainly want

to increase our exports of manufactured goods, we also look
forward to increasing our four billion dollar agricultural market
i n Japan, just as Japan looks forward to increasing its markets
o verseas.

The road runs two ways.

In this area our spec i fic in-

t e r ests closely match our larger mut ual interests.

Let me now tur n to the United States and outline a couple of
exampl es of the pol i t i cal sacrifices made by the Carter Administration in support of free trade .

Steel is an important industry

i n both our countries and steel from Japan, especially certain
specialty steels, accounts for a substantial part of the
ket.

u.s ~

mar-

Because of a combination of factors including tax policy,

-
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pollution control regulations, and labor problems, the

u.s.

industry faced hard times-- especially when confronted with
a flood of low-priced steel from Japan, Europe and elsewhere.
The steel issue had every possibility of becoming a disaster
for U.S. economic relations, not only with Japan, but with the
entire world.

Very stLvng and damaging protectionist legis-

latlon could easily have been written into law, and it would
not have stopped with steel.

Any number of other bills could

have ridden on the coattails of the steel caucus power-base
and we would have been in real trouble.

Fortunately for all

of us, the trigger or reference price system of the Solomon
Committee was accepted, at least on a trial basis, by both
American and Japanese steel industry leaders.

The plan should

insure a stability in our steel trade vitally necessary for the
future.

The trigger price system is not a permanent solution

but the new atmosphere of cooperation it has fostered will, one
hopes, continue for quite a long time in helping to make American
steel competitive with foreign steel in America.

Another good example is industrial fasteners.

The fastener

issue 1s not an emotional one for most Americans, unlike beef or
citrus here or steel in the U.S., but the

· ~ndustrlal

fastener imports issue could become a turning point in the battle
of protectionism vs.

free trade.

Over a month ago, President

Carter rejected a proposal to increase tariffs on industrial
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fastener imports .

He did this because he bel1eved that the

Japanese and others were not exercising unfa1r trade practices o
He was conv1nced that, in this case, our broader economic 1nterests in free trade were more 1mportant than the part1cular
needs of the

u. s .

industry, even though 1mports, pr1mar1ly

f r om Japan, account for almost half of the U. S o market for
nuts, bolts, and screws at a value of almost 300 m1llion dollars
a year .

This was a politically difficult decis1on for the Pres1-

dent to make because the
and a loss of 8,000 jobs .

u. s.

industry has seen a great decline

Even now, there is a very strong move

1n the Congress, with support from many sectors to overr1de the
Pres1dent ' s veto o

Ambassador Strauss and others are f1ghting

tooth and nail to see that the Congress does not take this first
step toward protectionism, but the issue 1s volatile.

Although the admin1stration 1s stand1ng f1rm for free
r ade on this issue and many others ranging from shoes to
t exti les, they need all1es in this fight o

Those allies could

well be the senators and congressmen from the beef and citrus
and grain states .

The struggle for free trade is not an easy

one anywhere; the price a politician pays in f1ghting for free

- 10 trade is often paid at the polls.

If the public believes

that the administration is sacrificing American jobs j ust for
the sake of amicable foreign relations then the already high
political price may become too great to bear.

Now I will turn to the larger economic picture for a
moment.

Japan's fiscal year has just ended.

I am sure that

you have read and understood the reports and statistics much
better than I.

Although your growth rate for the fiscal year

was not as high as expected and you still have some distance
to go to achieve full recovery, the general economic sit.uation
in Japan is relatively good when compared to other OECD countries.

Inflation rates in both the U.S. and Japan appear to

be under control, but we will have to keep a close eye on the
situation, especially in the UoS.

The Government of Japan is

t aking important steps to boost the economy by means of a general stimulus package.

We must give that package time to work

because it can help to resolve many of the specific problems
of the Japanese domestic economy while contributing to the
larger shared goal of global recovery.
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You all know that the U.S. ended the calendar year with
a record current accounts deficit while Japan ended the year
with a record surplus.

I agree with those who argue that

excess energy consumption is an important contributor to the
huge U.S. deficit.

We recognize the severe damage this causes

our economy and the world economy.

We have made some moves

to at least decrease the flow of oil, but more is required.
We need, and I hope soon will have, an effective energy bill,
one which will provide for rational management of our energy
needs and reduce our huge dependence upon imported oil.

We

must continue to work diligently to conserve and to restructure
our energy needs.

On the other hand, the U.S. cannot find all

the answers to its bilateral and multilateral trade problems
through the conservation of energy -- if we should suddenly cut
our oil imports in half, it would have the same destructive
effect on our economy that a similar cut in Japan would have
on yours.

-
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Oil has also created problems for Japan as well.

Since

the 1 9 7 3 oil cr1sis, Japan, faced w1th a huge increase in energy
c o sts, has successfully kept ahead of them and now has a large
trade and current accounts surplus.

Some economists believe

t hat J a pan over-reacted to the challenge presented by the oil
cr~s1s

and that the result1ng vigorous export drive has adverse-

ly a f fe c ted not only Japan's trading partners but also the wor l d
economy .

That over-reaction also shook the confidence of the

p ub l i c and had much to do with the downturn in Japan's domest i c
economy .

Per haps both phenomena-- the increased export drive

and t he domest1c

rece~sion

-- are related to the average Japanese '

bel1e f t ha t Japan 1s a poor country, w_th no resources, which
must strugg l e a l ong against the rest of the world .

True , Japan

does not have an abundance of the resources wh1ch are dug out
of t he ground

nor an abundance of ground.

But Japan did not

b e come t he second mos t power ful 1ndustrial democracy without
resources of s ome kind .

The resources I ' m talk i ng about a r e

some 11 4 million educated , skilled, productive, motivated people
In add it1on, Japan ' s economic community has an eff1cient, modern
physica l p l ant , g r eat capital resources, and i t knows how to
make th 1 ngs wor k .

ln fact, the barometer of the floating ex-

change r a t e would, at present, indicate that no one in the wo r l d
loo ks upon Japan as a poor country, nor should the Japanese
t hems e l v es .

I do not propose to recount all of the events of the past
yea r and I know that you are all very well informed about
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what has occurred in the intensive round of U.S.-Japan trade
talks which took place in December and January.

Ambassador

Strauss and Minister Ushiba are scheduled to meet next week

in Geneva.

I am sure that the same atmosphere of goodwill will

prevail in these talks in Geneva as well.

The major concern

at the highest levels of government in both Japan and the

u.s.

remains world trade -- world economic problems.

You have heard or read all the arguments

~o

and con on

reflation and the concept of locomotive economies.

I don't

think that I can add much to what has been said by others much
more qualified to speak on the topic except to say that I believe
that the commitments made by the
Ushiba

stateme~t

u.s.

and Japan in the Strauss-

are genuine and . in the best interests of both

countries and, in the long run, of the global economy.

However, to return to our bilateral problems, I believe
that the greatest dangers for both countries lie
problems nor in our mutual energy problem.

..--

in the widely held belief . in the

u.s.

or opportunity in our bilateral trade.

~

in global

The danger lies

of an economic imbalance
Japan's remaining

import restrictions, its rising exports and the problems American
manufacturers have in selling their products here • have brought
about the serious situation in the American Congress.

Japan's

current account balance in·January and February has been extremely high, . and this has imposed heavy burdens on other countries.

- 14 This situation should be reversed.

If it does not begin to

improve soon, Congress will, in all likelihood, begin to lose
patience and may well consider legislation which hurts trade
and the economic interests of all trading nations, especially
Japan.

The weight of our specific problems could become so

heavy as to override our larger interests.

I realize that I have been painting a pretty bleak picture.
The situation is not hopeless.

Far from it.

I believe that the

steps outlined in the Strauss-Ushiba Joint Statement record
substantial progress r.ot only with respect to the global picture
but also in laying the groundwork for a rapid change in the
Japanese market for imported goods.

First, both sides made commitments to the Tokyo Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations to reduce or eliminate barriers
to trade.

Both sides said they would lower tariffs on items

of interest to each other beyond the MTN standard formula levels.
Japan announced tariff reductions which took effect in advance
of the planned April 1 date.
for U.S.-Japan trade.
offers in the MTN.

This has improved the atmosphere

Japan has also made comprehensive tariff

We are not completely satisfied with them,

but we are moving in the right direction.

All of these efforts

are aimed at reconciling our specific domestic interests with
our broad-scale global aims.

-
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I believe that the forest products study group, the citrus

group and the beef group called for in the Joint Statement are
already maki ng substantial progress.
and study is necessary o

These are study groups,

For example, we must see · if we can pro-

duce finis hed lumber and wood products suited to the Japanese
market ® Part of the purpose of these groups is to study such
matching of t he p roducts to the market and to make sure that
1ndustry r egulations apply fairly to both the imported and
domestic prod u ct .

A great deal of attention on both sides of

t he Pacific will be focused on · these groups and what they come
up

with~

They can be substantial steps in the process of estab-

lishing equal access to Japanese markets .

These s tudy groups, along with other mechanisms of the
Trade Facilitation Committee, may also serve as a communications
channel whereby questi ons and criticisms can be answered d irect-

ly and

speedily ~

Far too often, questions have become str1dent

complaints simply because they have gone unanswered.

The indus-

trial chemical i mporter asks why he is havi ng great diffic ulty
penetrating t he J apanese market, especially when the domestic
price for the same chemicals may be substantially higher than
the world p r1ce.

If he does not get a satisfacbory answer, he

assumes; and · tells others, that Japan is a closed market .

I

sincerely hope that the Trade -Facilitation Committee will be
able to · remove al l such sources of friction and -mi sunderstandings .
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There is no doubt that America is a nation deep ly involved
i n international trade.

However, as international traders

Americans still have much to learn, and Japan provides some
useful examples.

If Americans wish to succeed in the Japanese

market they must do their homework -- through these study gro u ps
and in other ways.

Sometimes they will have to adapt their

products to suit the tastes and needs of the Japanese consumer .
This has been the key to Japan's success in our market; the same
formula should work here.

It is a long, hard process and there

is no such thing as a quick buck in t.his market.

The Ikeda

Mission played an important role in awakening American businessmen. to the potential market in Japan and I note that the Depart ment of Commerce is putting together a high-level export promotion
mission which will travel to Japan later this year.

I hope that

~

they can match the success of the Ikeda Mission.

The Ikeda Mission, or more properly the Japan Import
Promotion Mission, which went to the U.S. under the auspices of
the U. S . -Japan Joint Trade Facilitation Committee has been a
big newsmaker recently .

The trust given Mr. Ikeda and the o t he r

members of the mission was well placed.

The group worked hard

to explain some of the complexities of the Japanese economy
and to assist American businessmen in making the proper contacts
for exporting their products to Japan .
beyond anyone's expec.tations.

That mission succ eeded

Purchases of almost 2

bil l ~on

- 17 dollars have been registered.

Doubtless some of those purchases

would, sooner or later, have been made anyway, but 1/3 and more
of them are actually new.

That is an exceedingly clear sign

of Japan's commitment to open up its market to new products.

Both countries have strong economies and we have a strong
trading partnership, but it is absolutely essential that we both
recognize our mutual interests in complete equality of opportunity in both of our markets.

If Americans have the same access

into your market that you have in ours and still cannot compete
successfully or balance our bilateral trade, then the blame for
that imbalance will fall squarely upon the
ers and its exporters.

u.s.,

its manufactur-

But as long as any inequality or unfair

restrictions continue to exist, then Japan will continue to be
partially blamed -- fairly or unfairly -- for our trade imbalance .
Those are the facts of political life.

Free trade always has been in Japan's best interest.
Indeed the whole phenomenon of your postwar economic growth has
depended upon one essential:
the world.

free access to the markets of

Now, the time has come to demonstrate your complete

and open commitment to free trade by allowing others access to
your market.

Even if our two countries join forces in support

of the basic principles of free trade, we will have a long,
tough struggle ahead because those nations leaning toward some
form of protectionism far outnumber those standing up for

- 18 free trade.

If your nation or my nation succumbs to the

temptation to protect the marginal or economically weak segments of our economies, if we allow narrower political interests
to cloud our vision and prevent complete cooperation, then our
larger shared interests will bP. sacrificed and chaos will
follow;

chaos not only for Japan and the

u.s.,

but for all the

nations and peoples of the world.

The fluctuations which occur in a free economy are many
and they always produce both joy and sorrow .

In the free world,

we believe that the basic strength of a free economy is its
flexibility.

It can adjust, and adjust rapidly, to meet chang-

ing needs and circumstances .

And, it is tnose changes and that

flexibility which produce the opportunities and incentives which
power a free economy .

But one man's

opportunity may very well

be another man's bankruptcy as the production pattern moves to
meet changing tastes and needs.

We must strive to learn more

about how the marketplace works, and how to blunt the negative
aspects of fluctuation without resorting to protectionism .

Protectionism is an admission of failure, of inability to
cope with the challenges of a free market system.

Protectionism

means that a government has failed to find ways to make the
necessary adjustments in its domestic economy.

It me,•ns that a

government has failed to cope with changes in the global market .
It means surrendering broader national and international interests

- 19 to the demands of narrow specific
v~ew

in~erests.

I think we al

the prospect of protectionist legislation around the world

as a grave challenge, a potential cr1sis.

The danger 1s not

over; the flood waters of protectionism have not yet subsided
But perhaps they have crested .

&~d

we can begin now to addre&s

these problems not 1n an atmosphere of crisis or confrontat1on,
but : n one of trust and cooperation .

As I said at the beginning, I am no economist .
mag1c answer for all our econom1c ills .
that, since the 1973

o~l

1 have no

But I am conv1nced

crisis, our global economy has changed

1n a profound and fundamental way .

The classic econom1c pre-

s criptions established over centuries no longer seem to worK 7
and the solutions offered by so many econom1c "doctor s'' are ,
one by o ne, being found ineffective w1th every pass1ng da)'

~ ~ ~ cLe-fu~

~L

Cry<-~ ~~ ~ ~ Vb

~f'~

Nevertheless, I am an opt1m1st, ana I bel1eve that we can,

and

wil~,

f i nd

p rob l ems c

~oJutions

to our bilateral and globa l

econom~c

But fir st , we have to f1nd ways to det1ne and mea

~ra

the problems and to ag r ee upon their causes, for only w1th that
clea r kno wl edge c an we beg i n to devi se solut1ons -- solutions
wh ~ch

work .

Moreover , I am

conv~nced

that we must attack our

p r obl ems JOintly because they are t r uly

~

Japan 8 s problems and not just Arneri ca ' s o

problems -- not JUSt

And i t does us l1ttle

good to lectur e each other unless we are prepared to cooperate
i n find i ng answers .

-
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Answers are hard to come by.

Frankly, I don't bel ieve

anyone can say with absolute confidence that he knows what mus t
be done.

But we should be willing to break some new ground, to

try some audacious and unconventional solutions.

What would

happen, for example, if both Japan and the U.S. reduced tariff
rates to zero on commodities of major interest?
shoul~

Perhaps we

establish international understandings in certain capit a l-

intensive heavy industries such as steel, synthetic fibers or
petrochemicals , designed to avoid excessive and wasteful inves t ment by the world as a whole.

Realistic discussions and coordi-

nation of national export prospects and expectations shoul d be
possible in the context of maintaining stable markets and
facilitating rational business planning.

Parliamentary exch ange s

on a much broader scale would help, especially those which
involve the leadership of the various special committees dea l ing
with economics and trade .

And, finally, an on-going ser ies o f

seminars held throughout Japan on

u. s .

products and on t he

whole business of importing could be useful, especiall y seminars
d i rected toward smaller businesses, consumer groups and other s
who lack expertise in this area .

Both Japan and the

u.s .

hav e

justly-deserved reputafions as inventors, adaptors and i n nova tors
I think we have reached the point where some innovation i s nee ded.
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Let me close by repeating my belief that we must strengthen
our bilateral relationship in an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.

As Prime Minister Fukuda has said, our destinies are

joined

and those destinies depend upon . open and expanding

trade.

Together, we have learned some hard lessons and I think

that now we are ready to begin to apply those lessons, working
together.

*

*

